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Audit opinions and information asymmetry  
in the stock market 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the content of the audit reports 
and information asymmetry levels in the stock market for a sample of Spanish 
firms. By implementing an association study, we document (1) that firms with 
audit qualifications show higher information asymmetry levels than those with 
unqualified opinions; (2) firms with non-quantified qualifications show higher 
informational asymmetry than firms with quantified qualifications; and (3) we 
find a stronger effect on informational asymmetry level in the case of going 
concern qualifications. Our findings suggest that audit qualifications reporting 
more uncertainty on firm accounting statements result in higher adverse 
selection risk. 
Key Words: audit opinions, financial reporting quality, information 
asymmetry, adverse selection.  
JEL codes: M42, G14, D82 
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Audit opinions and information asymmetry  
in the stock market 
 
1. Introduction 
The main objective of financial reporting is to provide useful financial 
information for decision-making concerning investment, credit, and other 
questions related to the allocation of resources (IASB, 2011). As a 
consequence, high quality accounting information is a pre-requisite for the 
correct-functioning of the capital markets and the economy and can be 
considered as a means of reducing information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts. To this end, since the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, 
researchers, practitioners, and regulators have focused considerable attention 
on financial reporting quality in general, and the role played by auditors in 
particular. 
An important issue within this framework is the effectiveness of auditors and 
intermediaries who intervene in the process of assessing and communicating 
the reliability of financial information to enhance the credibility of financial 
reporting (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Effectively, because management is 
responsible for preparing financial reports, accounting users, such as market 
participants, expect an objective third party to provide assurance that the 
information reported is accurate.  
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The audit report presents the auditor’s opinion regarding whether a firm’s 
financial statements conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). In other words, the external auditor assesses the validity and 
reliability of publicly reported financial information. In this sense, through a 
non-qualified audit report the auditors express that, in their opinion, all 
accounting standards have been properly observed by the company, thus 
enhancing the credibility of the financial statements. By contrast, a qualified 
audit opinion is the auditors’ way of communicating with outside investors 
their concerns or reservations about the quality of the firm’s financial 
statements or their inability to gather sufficient and appropriate information. 
Hence, the audit opinion is likely to affect the interpretation of financial 
information by stock market participants as it is through audit qualifications 
that auditors signal that earnings numbers generated by the firm are noisier or 
less credible than in unqualified reports (Choi and Jeter, 1992).  
In this paper we focus on the effectiveness of audit reports to enhance the 
credibility of financial statements, and address a research question that has not 
yet been answered in the literature: whether audit qualifications and their 
different categories are associated with information asymmetry in the stock 
market. Since a qualified audit opinion may raise concerns about the reliability 
of the firm’s financial information, and thus introduce noise in the assessment 
of the financial statements, we expect that those firms with qualified audit 
reports will show higher information asymmetry than those with unqualified 
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opinions. Moreover, since audit qualifications are not homogeneous, as some 
appear to be potentially more significant than others, and some provide clearer 
information than others, we expect that the relation between audit opinions and 
information asymmetry depends on the different type of audit qualifications. 
Following the classification of qualified opinions proposed by Melumad and 
Ziv (1997) and Pucheta et al. (2004), we hypothesize that those qualified audit 
opinions -e.g. qualifications for asset realization, timing of revenue 
recognition, and GAAP compliance- that quantify their repercussions on the 
financial statements will be associated with less uncertainty, less disperse 
interpretations, and less information asymmetry than those qualifications that 
include unquantifiable uncertainties and going concern. 
With regard to the consequences of auditing on information asymmetry,  
previous literature has examined the association of information asymmetry in 
the market with audit compensation (Ascioglu et al., 2005; Danielsen et al., 
2007) and audit quality, proxied by Big n and industry specialists auditors 
(Clinch et al., 2012). The main findings obtained are that higher audit 
compensation is associated with greater adverse selection and lower liquidity in 
the market, while higher quality auditors enhance the credibility of the 
information reported by companies and thus reduce the level of information 
asymmetry among investors. A related stream of literature on the information 
content of audit opinions has analyzed the stock price reaction when the 
qualified audit opinion is disclosed. Here, the evidence is mixed (e.g. Dodd et 
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al., 1984; Dopuch et al., 1986; Chen et al., 2000; Pucheta et al., 2004) and can 
be attributed to the typical limitations of short-run event study methodology 
(Choi and Jeter, 1992, Soltani, 2000). Taking a different approach, Choi and 
Jeter (1992) extend the studies on market reaction to audit qualifications by 
analyzing their effect on the earnings response coefficient, and find that the 
issue of qualified audit reports is followed by a reduction in the earnings 
response coefficient. However, the authors are unable to discern whether the 
decrease in the market’s responsiveness to earnings is motivated by the signal 
conveyed to the market by audit opinions about the level of uncertainty in the 
firm’s earnings numbers, or because the audit opinion reflects the underlying 
economic situation of the firm. 
More recent research has analyzed the stock market reaction to a specific type 
of audit qualification, that of the going concern opinion, by using the long-run 
event study methodology (e.g. Taffler et al., 2004; Ogneva and Subramayam, 
2007; Kausar et al., 2009) or by examining firms’ financial statement 
components for assessing share price valuation (Blay et al., 2011). This 
literature concludes that the going concern opinion is a valuable risk 
communication to the equity market. There is also a current line of research 
focusing on the consequences of audit opinions in the debt market (Niemi and 
Sundgren, 2012; Chen et al., 2014). Nevertheless, our study is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first to examine whether the information contained in the 
final output of the auditing process has economic consequences in terms of 
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information asymmetry in the stock market. In doing this, we also try to isolate 
the effect of the audit qualification on information asymmetry in the market by 
controlling for endogeneity and the other underlying economic or financial 
reporting characteristics of the firms. 
We test our hypotheses in a sample of Spanish non-financial firms in the period 
2001-2008. Auditing of the annual financial statements by independent 
auditors has been compulsory for all Spanish listed companies since the 
implementation of the Spanish Audit Act (Ley de Auditoría) in 1990. Spain is a 
code law country where the litigation risk against auditors is low, but the 
reforms introduced by the Financial Act in 2002 have led to an increase in 
audit quality (De las Heras et al., 2012). This reform was introduced with the 
aim of enhancing auditor independence and competence by imposing quality 
controls under the supervision of the Institute of Accounting and Auditing 
(ICAC) along with stricter disciplinary sanctions. With respect to the content of 
the audit report, in Spain the audit report refers to the complete financial 
statements; thus it is not permitted to have an unqualified opinion on one of the 
financial statements and a qualified or adverse opinion or disclaimer on 
another. Moreover, audit reports for Spanish firms show high variability in 
audit qualifications, which makes the Spanish case a suitable context for 
examining the association between the different categories of audit 
qualifications and information asymmetry. 
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We compute various market microstructure proxies for information asymmetry 
using high frequency data: the relative spread, intraday price impact, the 
probability of informed trading (PIN), and an index of information asymmetry 
as the first principal component of the three former measures. According to our 
hypotheses, we find that firms with qualified audit opinions show higher 
adverse selection risk in the market. Our findings also indicate that the 
association between audit qualifications and information asymmetry is 
motivated by qualifications including unquantifiable uncertainties and going-
concern given that we cannot find a significant association between 
quantifiable qualifications and information asymmetry. These findings suggest 
that the information included in quantified qualifications can be used by market 
participants to unanimously adjust the earnings and equity numbers of the firm. 
Finally, within the non-quantified audit opinions, we find that the category of 
going concern appears to have a stronger relation with the level of 
informational asymmetry in the market. 
An alternative explanation for our results could be that economic 
characteristics of the firms, such as their financial situation or earnings 
management, lead to information asymmetry and qualified audit opinions 
simply reflect this fact (Choi and Jeter, 1992). In order to clarify whether the 
audit opinion creates or merely reveals information asymmetry caused by other 
variables, or even if our findings are conditioned by endogeneity between 
information asymmetry and audit opinions, we carry out several robustness 
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tests. Thus, we control for the financial situation of the firm and earnings 
management in order to rule out the possibility that these variables are causing 
the association between audit opinions and information asymmetry. We also 
address the possible endogeneity between the audit opinion and information 
asymmetry, i.e., information asymmetry may cause audit opinions, by running 
a two-stage estimation procedure where, in the first stage, the probability of 
qualified audit opinions is obtained through a probit model that includes 
information asymmetry as an explanatory variable. The results indicate that the 
firm’s financial situation (earnings management) is negatively (positively) 
associated with the probability of issuing a qualified audit opinion, but we do 
not find a significant effect of information asymmetry on this probability. 
Besides, the estimates in the second stage including the probability of audit 
opinions as an independent variable confirm our previous results. All these 
findings support our hypothesis that it is the audit opinion which causes 
information asymmetry in the market. 
This paper contributes to the literature on microstructure and the economic 
consequences of financial reporting by showing that the content of the audit 
report affects the credibility of firm’s financial statements, and that the market 
is able to interpret each type of qualification differently. Our findings are 
consistent with related research on the market effects of disclosure and 
earnings quality (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; 
Lambert et al., 2007 & 2012) and with research that examines the effect of 
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audit opinions on contracting (Chen et al., 2014) by confirming that adverse 
audit opinions have relevant economic value for markets participants. This 
paper also extends previous research on the economic consequences of 
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010) suggesting that audit qualifications, as 
an external indicator of financial reporting quality, have market effects among 
traders. These results may be of interest to those wishing to understand the 
market effect of the credibility of financial information and, in particular, for 
academic researchers, investors, managers, regulators, and institutions related 
to the auditing profession. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on audit opinions and information asymmetry and develops our 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design in detail, with the 
model, the description of the different variables and the sample. Section 4 
shows the results and the final section presents the main conclusions of the 
paper. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
Previous theoretical research has shown that more and better firm disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders or 
among traders in the stock market. Higher disclosure quality should reduce 
information asymmetry by reducing private information search incentives 
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(Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004), 
and the relative amount of informed trading (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989; 
Merton, 1987). Since information asymmetries create costs by introducing 
adverse selection into transactions between buyers and sellers (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000), the reduction of the advantage of informed investors 
reduces the risk of adverse selection and improves the level of liquidity for 
firm shares (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
Prior empirical research has analyzed the relation between information 
asymmetry among market participants and disclosure and earnings quality. 
Regarding disclosure, empirical studies employ overall disclosure quality 
scores calculated by different analysts’ associations such as the Association of 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) or the Financial Analysts 
Federation (FAF). The evidence shows that higher quality disclosure is 
negatively associated with effective bid-ask spreads (Welker, 1995; Healy et 
al., 1999), adverse selection spread components (Heflin et al., 2005), and the 
average level of information asymmetry measured by PIN (Brown and 
Hillegeist, 2007). From an earnings quality perspective, Bhattacharya et al. 
(2013) find that higher reporting quality, proxy by measures of accrual-based 
earnings management, leads to higher liquidity and lower trading costs.  
Our study differs from this stream of literature in that it is focused on the role 
played by the audit report in enhancing the credibility of financial information 
reported by firms. Financial information may reduce investors’ assessed 
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information risk in the market if investors perceive financial information to be 
credible (Hope et al., 2011). In this sense, auditors contribute to assess the 
reliability of financial information, with the audit opinion representing a crucial 
piece of information for financial statement users (Butler et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, since a qualified audit opinion manifests concerns about the 
reliability of the firm’s financial information, it increases the uncertainty about 
the precision of accounting figures and thus, augments the information risk in 
the assessment of financial statements by market participants.  
Despite the importance of the audit opinion in evaluating the quality of 
accounting information, there is little evidence regarding the relevance of the 
audit report conclusions in stock markets. Basically, the majority of prior 
studies have focused on whether the audit report release brings new 
information to the market by studying the market reaction to qualified audit 
opinions on the days around the announcement. These studies provide 
ambiguous evidence that may be attributed to problems in research design: data 
selection and methodological issues such as the difficulty to clearly determine 
the correct event date, the measurement of the unanticipated component of the 
announcement, and the potentially confounding effects of simultaneous news 
releases (Choi and Jeter, 1992; Soltani, 2000). On the one hand, studies such as 
Firth (1978), Dodd et al. (1984), and Pucheta et al. (2004) show that qualified 
opinions do not provide investors with new information, in part because they 
can be anticipated. On the other hand, other studies such as Dopuch et al. 
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(1986), Chen et al. (2000), and Soltani (2000), report significant negative price 
revisions to qualified audit reports, suggesting that qualified audit opinions 
convey adverse information to the market. Choi and Jeter (1992) examine 
another insight into the capital market effects of audit opinions and, for a 
sample of ‘subject to’ and consistency qualifications, find a reduction in the 
earnings response coefficient after the issuances of qualified audit opinions. 
According to Choi and Jeter (1992), this finding is consistent with two 
alternative explanations: The first one is that audit qualifications signal to the 
market that earnings numbers provided by the firm are more uncertain or less 
persistent than expected. The second interpretation is that audit qualifications 
may reflect underlying changes in the economic conditions of firms and these 
changes, rather than the qualification itself, cause the decline in the earnings 
response coefficient. 
We hypothesize that qualified audit opinions affect the investors’ perception of 
earnings uncertainty or quality, but our study differs from previous research in 
that we are not interested in the reaction of stock prices around the date of the 
audit report announcement. We examine how audit opinions are related to the 
average level of information asymmetry among market participants. Therefore, 
we examine the audit opinion-information asymmetry relation in an association 
study context. In this sense, a branch of literature which is more related to our 
study design is one which analyzes the effect of audit opinions on contracting 
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in the private debt market (Chen et al.., 2014; Neimi and Sundgren, 2012).
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Moreover, this type of analysis will help both to ascertain whether audit 
opinions provide the market with useful information, avoiding the weaknesses 
of traditional event studies, and to look deeper into the directional association 
between audit qualification opinions and information asymmetry. 
Our first hypothesis can be stated as follows:  
H1: Firms with qualified audit reports will show higher information asymmetry 
in the stock market than those with unqualified opinions. 
Audit qualifications can be of different types and it is expected that their 
market effects depend on the information conveyed in the audit report to 
investors. Following classifications used in previous research (Melumad and 
Ziv, 1997; Pucheta et al., 2004), we group audit qualifications into those that 
quantify their repercussions on financial statements- e.g. qualifications for 
asset realization, timing of revenue recognition, and GAAP compliance- and 
those that cannot be quantified –uncertainties and scope limitations, and going 
concern. We analyze whether either category of qualification reveals 
differences in information asymmetry in the market when compared to 
unqualified opinions. We expect that those qualifications that involve higher 
uncertainty and which, as a consequence, are less easily adjusted by market 
                                                          
1
 Consistent with the monitoring role of audit opinion on accounting quality, Chen et al (2014) 
find that a qualified audit opinion is associated with increases in the interest rate of loans, 
lower loan sizes, and a higher likelihood of collateral requirement. On the other hand, Niemi 
and Sundgren (2012) do not find, for a sample of small and medium sized firms, that audit 
qualifications affect credit availability from institutional lenders. 
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participants, will be associated with higher information asymmetry than those 
that are easily adjusted. So our second hypothesis is the following: 
H2: Firms with non-quantified audit qualifications will show higher 
information asymmetry in the stock market than those with quantified 
qualifications. 
Finally and focusing on non-quantified qualifications, we consider going 
concern opinions as a kind of more sensitive and significant information that 
could generate more controversial opinions and interpretations in the market. 
Going concern audit reports are disclosed by auditors with substantial doubts 
about the ability of the audited firm to continue to exist. On the contrary, 
uncertainties and scope limitations qualifications are released when the auditor 
shows disagreement to specific aspects of the financial statements but it is not 
possible to quantify their effects or they cannot be thoroughly examined 
because of various problems in carrying out the auditing task. Therefore, we 
expect going concern qualifications to have stronger effects on informational 
asymmetries in the market than those regarding uncertainties and scope 
limitations. 
H3: Firms with non-quantified qualifications regarding going concerns will 
show higher information asymmetry in the stock market than those with non-
quantified qualifications concerning uncertainties and scope limitations. 
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3. Research design 
3.1. Model specification 
To examine the association between the audit opinion and different proxies for 
information asymmetry, we use the following regression model:  
0 1 1 2 3 4
5 1 6


     
     
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
ASY β β QAO β Size β Turnover β Volat
β BigN β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
  (1) 
where ASY is one of our four proxies for information asymmetry and QAO 
corresponds to the different types of qualified audit opinions. Both variables 
are discussed in detail in the next two subsections. QAO is lagged by one year 
relative to ASY because the audit report released each year refers to annual 
financial statements for the previous one. As control variables we include Size, 
Turnover, Volat, BigN, and Zscore. The microstructure literature shows that 
firm size, trading volume, and stock volatility are important determinants of 
stock liquidity and the information asymmetry level. In particular, prior studies 
provide empirical evidence of big, frequently traded and less volatile firms 
being more liquid and suffering lower information asymmetry problems (e.g. 
Easley et al., 1996; Stoll, 2000). Size is measured as the logarithm of the total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year. Turnover is the logarithm of the average 
daily trading volume in euros scaled by the market value of the firm’s equity at 
the end of the year. Volat is a proxy for stock return volatility calculated as the 
daily squared close-to-open mid-quote return. We expect β2<0, β3<0, and 
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β4>0. The variable BigN is a proxy for audit quality, which takes value 1 if the 
firm is audited by a Big n auditor and 0 otherwise. Clinch et al. (2012) find that 
employing a Big n auditor is associated with lower information asymmetry 
between traders (β5<0 is expected). Zscore represents firms’ financial strength 
measured with the re-estimated Altman Z-score by Begley et al. (1996):  
0.106 0.169 1.01 0.104 0.003

  
 
Zscore
EBIT Sales RE WC MarketValue Equity
Total Assets Book Value Debt
 (2) 
where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, RE retained earnings, and WC 
working capital. Prior research shows that financial distress is associated with 
the probability of receiving an audit qualification (e.g. Hudaib and Cooke, 
2005). This is particularly relevant in the case of going concern audit opinions, 
because this type of audit qualification is issued for firms approaching 
bankruptcy or that show increasing signs of financial distress (Blay et al., 
2011). Finally, to control for temporal and industrial effects, we include year 
and industry dummy variables.  
In order to investigate further into the directional association between the audit 
opinion and information asymmetry and thus consider the possible endogenous 
relation between them, we also employ a two-stage probit approach (Brown 
and Hillegeist, 2007). It is possible that firms with high information asymmetry 
among investors may be more likely to receive an audit qualification or that 
firm characteristics may simultaneously affect information asymmetry and 
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qualified audit opinions.
2
 In the first stage, we use the following probit 
estimation of the probability of receiving an audit qualification: 
0 1 2 3
4 5
( )

    
    
i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
P QAO β β Size β BigN β Zscore
β DiscAcc β ASY βYear β Ind ε
  (3) 
where DiscAcc is the the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by 
the Jones (1991) model modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and the rest of 
variables have been defined previously. Prior research on the determinants of 
audit qualifications includes firm size, auditor size, and proxies for financial 
situation as explanatory variables of the probability of issuing a modified audit 
report (e.g. Dopuch et al., 1987; Ireland, 2003). We also include DiscAcc, a 
proxy for earnings management, since prior studies suggest that high 
discretionary accruals are associated with audit qualifications (e.g. Bartov et 
al., 2000). In the second stage, we include the fitted probability from the first-
stage as an explanatory variable for the information asymmetry model. 
 0 1 2 31
4 5 1 6


    
      
i,t i,t i,ti,t
i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
ASY β β Est QAO β Size β Turnover
β Volat β BigN β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
  (4) 
where Est(QAO) is the fitted probability of receiving an audit qualification and 
the rest of the variables have been defined previously. 
                                                          
2
 We want to thank the anonymous referee and the editor for their comments regarding this 
point. 
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3.2. Proxies for information asymmetry 
Market microstructure literature has proposed various measures and procedures 
to capture financial market perception on the adverse selection that exists 
between informed and uninformed traders. In contrast to the measures 
introduced by corporate finance, market microstructure exploits several sources 
of information contained in intraday data to capture the presence of traders 
with better information. The first and effortless measure of asymmetric 
information is the bid-ask spread, a widely used measure of trading costs 
(liquidity). Bid-ask spread incorporates a component related to the protection 
that liquidity providers demand for being adversely selected. Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) theoretically show that the 
mere presence of traders with different levels of information is enough to 
explain the existence of the bid-ask spread. However, bid-ask spread is a noisy 
measure of asymmetric information due to the fact that it commonly includes 
components other than information (inventory costs, order processing costs or 
monopoly rents, among others). In our analysis, we compute the relative 
effective spread (RES) as follows:
3
 
2* 

t t
t
t
p Q
RES
Q
     (5) 
                                                          
3
 In contrast with US markets, trading is not allowed inside the best quotes in the Spanish 
(order-driven) market. However, RES computation is meaningful since by using the marginal 
price, we incorporate the role played by aggressive orders in the analysis (see Biais et al, 
1995). 
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where pt is the marginal price of trade t. Qt = (at+bt)/2 is the quoted midpoint in 
t, commonly used as a proxy for the efficient price; at and bt corresponds to the 
ask and the bid quotes in t. This measure is computed first on a daily basis by 
averaging all the observations within the day. Bid-ask spread observations are 
recorded in trade-time and then, a volume-weighted average is computed. After 
that, a yearly observation is obtained by averaging (equally-weighted) all the 
days within the year.  
Huang and Stoll (1996) introduce the realized spread and the price impact by 
considering the quote adjustment that takes place a period of time after a trade 
to extract the presence of new information. Price impact (PI) is our second 
approach to asymmetric information and is defined as follows:  
( )   t t t tPI Q Q X      (6) 
where Qt is the quote midpoint defined previously, Xt is a trade indicator 
variable taking the value -1 if the trade in t is initiated on the sell side and 1 if it 
is initiated on the buy side. Finally, τ is the period of time for prices to fully 
reflect the information content in trade t. Following Huang and Stoll (1996) we 
used periods of 5 and 30 minutes.
 4
 Similar to the relative effective spread 
(RES), Price Impact (PI) is also computed in trade-time by averaging (volume-
                                                          
4
 We only report here the results using the 30-minute price impact. The results using the 5-
minute price impact are quite similar to those presented and they are available upon request 
from the authors. 
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weighted) all the trades within the day and after that, by averaging (equally 
weighted) all the trading days within the year. 
As a third measure of information asymmetry, we compute the probability of 
information-based trading (PIN), a measure that can be included into the group 
of the asymmetric information measures based on the computation of order 
imbalances between buys and sells to extract the information content of the 
trading process. PIN is a well-known measure based on the theoretical work of 
Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992), although the original PIN model was 
introduced by Easley et al. (1996). The PIN is the unconditional probability 
that a randomly selected trade originates from an informed trader. This 
measure is not directly observable but a function of the theoretical parameters 
of a microstructure model that have to be estimated by numerical maximization 
of a likelihood function. Once the parameters of interest are estimated, PIN is 
calculated as: 
sb
PIN



      (7) 
where α is the probability of an information event occurs between trading days, 
µ is the arrival rate of orders from the informed traders, and εb and εs are the 
arrival rate of buy and sell orders from uniformed traders, respectively. Thus, 
the PIN is the ratio of orders from informed traders to the total number of 
orders.  
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We estimate first the PIN model via maximum likelihood for each stock and 
month in each year. Easley et al. (1997) indicate that a 30 trading-day window 
allows sufficient trade observations for the PIN estimation procedure. Akay et 
al. (2012) use 20 trading days to estimate PIN finding numerical solutions for 
all their estimations. Hence, the use of one-month transaction data should be 
wide enough to produce reliable estimates.
5
 Once monthly PIN estimations are 
obtained, and if we get at least six valid values, an annual PIN is calculated by 
averaging monthly values.  
Finally, to isolate the common adverse selection component underlying the 
prior three proxies we aggregate them into a single information asymmetry 
factor (ASYf) by employing principal components analysis. The first (and only) 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than one explains 78.8% of the variance and 
each component of the asymmetry factor enters with positive sign and similar 
weight, leading to the following ASYf measure, which is used as our fourth 
information asymmetry proxy:  
0.405 0.396 0.320  it it it itASYf RES PI PIN   (8) 
                                                          
5
 We use the optimization algorithm of the Matlab software. We run the maximum likelihood 
function 100 times for each stock in our sample, except for several large stocks, for which we 
increase the iterations to 1000 to ensure that a maximum is reached. We follow Yan and Zhang 
(2012) proposal to set initial values for the five parameters in the likelihood function. 
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3.3. Audit Opinions variables 
To test our three hypotheses on the relationship between audit opinions and 
information asymmetry in the stock market, we use dummy variables for the 
different audit reports categories.  
To test our first hypothesis about clean audit reports leading to lower 
information asymmetry than qualified reports, we define QAO as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 in the case of a qualified opinion, and zero in the 
case of an unqualified opinion. Since we predict that qualified audit reports 
generate more information asymmetry, we expect β1>0 in model (1). 
To test our second hypothesis about the relationship between information 
asymmetry and the type of information contained in the auditor qualifications, 
we follow the approaches of Melumad and Ziv (1997) and Pucheta et al. 
(2004) and identify two types of qualified opinion: quantified and non-
quantified. In the case of quantified qualifications the auditor not only issues a 
qualified audit report but also quantifies the extent of asset overstatement 
and/or liability non-recognition or nondisclosure that cause the qualification. 
These qualifications generally arise from material errors or instances of non-
compliance with accounting standards, or from significant changes in the 
accounting principles and standards applied by the company. Non-quantified 
qualifications include those for future financing, going concern, scope 
limitations and uncertainties that cannot be objectively quantified. In these 
cases, the auditors cannot estimate the effect of their qualifications on financial 
24 
 
statements. Based on this classification of audit qualifications, we define two 
dummy variables:  
- Quantified is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of 
quantified audit reports, and zero in the case of unqualified audit 
reports.  
- Non-quantified is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the 
case of non-quantified audit opinions (going concern, scope 
limitations and uncertainties), and zero in the case of unqualified 
audit opinions.  
With Non-quantified and Quantified proxies we test whether the level of 
information asymmetry in the stock market depends on the quantified 
information contained in the audit report. In this sense, we expect a higher 
level of information asymmetry in the stock market for those firms with non-
quantified audit reports. Non-quantified reports can be considered as less 
objective and/or containing more ambiguous information that may lead to 
confusing interpretations among financial statements users thereby increasing 
informational asymmetries.   
Finally, we will also analyse the market effect of both types of non-quantified 
reports, going concern on one side, and uncertainties and scope limitations on 
the other. We expect going concern reports to contain more sensitive 
information which may provoke a higher level of adverse selection in the 
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market. For this, we use the third and fourth proxies of audit opinions to test 
our third hypothesis:  
- Gconcern, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of a 
going concern audit report, and zero in the case of unqualified audit 
opinions;  
- Uncertainties, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of 
uncertainties and scope limitations, and zero in the case of 
unqualified audit opinions. 
3.4. Market description, data, and sample 
Our sample is made up of stocks traded on the electronic trading platform of 
the Spanish Stock Exchange, known as the SIBE (Sistema de Interconexión 
Bursátil Español). The SIBE is an order-driven market where liquidity is 
provided by an open limit order book. Trading is continuous from 9:00 a.m. to 
5:30 p.m. There are two regular call auctions each day: the first one determines 
the opening price (8:30-9:00 a.m.), while the second one sets the official 
closing price (5:30-5:35 p.m.). Three basic types of orders are allowed: limit 
orders, market orders, and market-to-limit orders. In the continuous session, a 
trade occurs whenever an incoming order matches one or more orders on the 
opposite side of the limit order book. Submitted orders that are not 
instantaneously executed are stored in the book waiting for a counterparty 
according to a price-time priority rule. Unexecuted orders can always be 
cancelled and modified. Continuous trading could be temporarily interrupted 
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by a system of stock-specific intraday price limits and short-lived call auctions 
that is implemented to handle unusual volatility levels. In all auctions (open, 
close and volatility) orders can be submitted, modified or cancelled, but no 
trades occur. 
Trade and quote data for this study come from SM data files provided by 
Sociedad de Bolsas, S.A. SM files comprise detailed time-stamped information 
about the first level of the limit order book for each stock listed on the SIBE. 
Any trade, order submission or cancellation affecting best prices in the book 
generate a new record. The distinction between buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated trades is straightforward, without the need to use a classification 
algorithm. The audit opinion data were taken from the Spanish Securities 
Market Commission (CNMV), and the firms’ financial statement data were 
obtained from the SABI database, made by Bureau Van Dijk.  
The initial sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on the main segment 
of the SIBE in the period 2001-2008. After applying the usual filters to detect 
and eliminate errors in the preparation of the intraday trading data and the 
financial data, we consider those firm-year observations for which we have 
been able to collect the type of audit opinions, the information asymmetry 
measures and the control variables. The final sample consists of 103 firms and 
562 firm-year observations.  
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables of our sample. Panel A 
reports the mean value, the standard deviation and the percentiles 10%, 50% 
and 90% for continuous variables. The mean (median) of relative effective bid-
ask spread (RES) is 0.66% (0.44%). The average (median) of price impact 
measure (PI) is 0.38% (0.30%). As expected PI shows lower values than RES 
since PI is a less noisy measure of information asymmetry than RES. The 
probability of informed trade (PIN) shows a mean (median) value around 19% 
(18%). These PIN values are consistent with those reported in prior studies that 
use this information asymmetry proxy (e.g. Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). The 
statistical distributions of the above measures show that there are clear 
differences in the degree of asymmetric information among the firms included 
in our sample. Finally, market control variables (size, turnover, and volatility) 
show a significant level of dispersion in their values reflecting the 
heterogeneity of our firm-year sample. Panel B shows the frequencies of 
dummy variables for audit opinions: 12.63% of the audit report observations 
present qualifications whereas 87.37% are unqualified. Qualifications are 
distributed into uncertainties and scope limitations (46.48%), going concern 
(26.76%) and quantified (26.76%). Most of the audit reports are issued by Big 
N auditors (94.13%).  
-INSERT TABLE 1- 
Table 2 reports different statistics regarding audit opinions in our sample. Panel 
A shows the distribution of audit qualifications per firm-year. For the general 
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category, QAO, and for each specific category two columns are reported: the 
first column indicates the number of firms receiving a certain number of 
qualifications in our eight-year sample period (from a minimum of 1 to a 
maximum of 8) and the second column shows the total number of 
qualifications. Thus, according to these values, there are 19 firms that receive 
only one qualification in the period 2001-2008, 7 firms receive two 
qualifications, and only 1 firm obtains qualifications every year. The average 
number of qualifications obtained by those firms that receive at least one 
qualification is 2.09. For the different categories of audit opinions, the 
distribution of firm-year observations is similar. Therefore, this distribution of 
qualifications in the sample rules out the possibility that the results of our 
analysis could be driven by a few firms with repeated qualifications. Panel B 
displays the descriptive statistics of the magnitude of quantified opinions, 
where Quantification is the income effect of quantified opinions over total 
assets and Abs_Quantification is the absolute value of Quantification. We 
observe that 16 quantified opinions imply a reduction of firm’s earnings by the 
auditors (negative values) whereas only 3 quantified opinions involve corrected 
earnings higher than those reported (positive values). Moreover, in absolute 
terms, the negative corrections are higher than the positive ones. This means 
that firms tend to deviate from GAAP to overstate their earnings, and that 
auditors reduce these numbers by issuing a quantified audit opinion. The nature 
of these quantified opinions is diverse. Bearing in mind that in several firm-
year observations there may be more than one cause for issuing an audit report 
29 
 
with a quantified qualification, the most frequent discrepancies reported are the 
following: goodwill amortization with reserves instead of expenses (8 cases); 
fiscal aspects, i.e. change of criterion in the accounting of tax deductions, 
adjustment of fiscal assets and liabilities because of a tax rate change, or 
incorrectly recorded recoverable taxes (4); discrepancies related to adjustments 
of the book value of assets (4); goodwill amortization in excess or provision 
surplus (3); and incorrectly recorded outstanding expenses (3). Finally, Panel C 
shows that the distribution of audit opinions by type of auditor is quite similar. 
 
-INSERT TABLE 2- 
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation matrix between our continuous 
variables. All the information asymmetry proxies report positive and 
significant correlations between them, with values above 90% between RES 
and PI, and around 58% (51%) between PIN and RES (PI). Moreover, they 
show higher correlations with ASYf (96%, 94%, and 76% with RES, PI, and 
PIN, respectively). The correlations between information asymmetry proxies 
and control variables are significant and they present the expected signs 
according to previous literature (with the exception of volatility with PIN, 
which is not significant). 
- INSERT TABLE 3- 
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4. Results 
The empirical section starts with a univariate analysis of the relation between 
audit opinions and information asymmetry. We examine whether there is a 
significant difference in the level of information asymmetry between firms 
with clean audit reports and firms with qualified audit reports. Panel A of Table 
4 presents mean values for our proxies for information asymmetry in both 
groups, as well as t-test and Mann-Whitney test (z-statistic) values to check the 
null hypothesis of no significant differences between both types of audit 
reports. The univariate analysis confirms that audit qualifications are associated 
with higher levels of information asymmetry. We also test whether there is a 
significant difference or not in the level of information asymmetry between 
firms audited by a Big n auditor. The results presented in Panel B of Table 4 
suggest that audit reports issued by Big n auditors are associated with lower 
levels of information asymmetry in the market.  
- INSERT TABLE 4- 
After the preliminary analysis, we evaluate the relation between audit opinions 
and information asymmetry through four OLS regressions with clustered 
standard errors at the firm level and controlling for other variables as described 
in Model (1). Table 5 reports the results for the different information 
asymmetry proxies used as dependent variables. Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on QAO is positive and statistically 
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significant (5% level) in three out of four regressions, suggesting that qualified 
audit reports are significantly associated with higher levels of information 
asymmetry once we control for other variables. In addition, the signs of the 
coefficients on control variables are as expected according to prior literature 
and all of them, except in the PIN regression, are statistically significant. We 
also find, as shown in the univariate analysis, that those reports issued by Big n 
auditors present significantly lower information asymmetry (10% level), with 
the exception of the PIN regression.  
- INSERT TABLE 5- 
Since our results show that audit qualifications are associated with a higher 
level of information asymmetry, our next step is to test whether this 
relationship depends on the type of qualified opinion issued by the auditor. 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for the regression of the composite 
index of information asymmetry (ASYf) on each of type of qualified opinion 
and control variables.
6
 According to our second hypothesis, we expect that 
firms with non-quantified qualifications (going concern, uncertainties and 
scope limitations) present higher levels of information asymmetry than those 
with quantified qualifications in their audit reports. Columns (1) and (2) report 
                                                          
6
 The results for H2 and H3 are reported exclusively using the composite index of asymmetric 
information (ASYf). The results using the other three measures are qualitatively quite similar to 
those reported. Regarding H2, quantified qualifications do not show significant associations 
with RES, PI, and PIN, whereas non-quantified qualifications are significantly associated with 
each of these measures. With regard to H3, when we split non-quantified qualifications into 
going concern and uncertainties, we find a significant association of going concern and 
uncertainties with RES and PI, but not with PIN at conventional levels. All results are available 
upon request from the authors. 
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the OLS regressions for ASYf on Quantified and Non-quantified audit 
qualifications, respectively. We observe that the coefficient on Non-quantified 
audit qualifications is positive and significant (at the 1% level), which means 
that non-quantified audit reports generate more information asymmetry than 
unqualified reports. Nevertheless, the coefficient on Quantified audit 
qualifications, although positive, is not statistically significant. These findings 
suggest that when the auditor provides precise information about the 
quantitative impact of the qualifications on earnings, this kind of information 
causes fewer heterogeneous interpretations, thus avoiding the possible 
exacerbation of information asymmetry problems in the stock market. As was 
shown in Table 5, control variables behaviour is consistent with previous 
literature. 
- INSERT TABLE 6 - 
Once we have found that non-quantified audit qualifications are positively and 
significantly associated with adverse selection risk in the market, we further 
examine whether this relationship depends on the kind of information disclosed 
by non-quantified qualifications. Thus, non-quantified qualifications are sub-
divided into two categories: going concern, and uncertainties and scope 
limitations. Column (3) of Table 6 shows the regression results for going 
concern qualifications whereas Column (4) reports the regression results for 
uncertainties and scope limitations. In the case of going concern reports, we 
find a positive and significant association with ASYf at the 1% level, whereas in 
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the case of uncertainties and scope limitations the coefficient is also positive 
and significant at the 5% level. However, the effect is clearly stronger for 
going concern opinions, whose coefficient on information asymmetry is around 
four times higher than that obtained in the other category. Therefore, we can 
assert that both categories are related with higher levels of adverse selection in 
the market once we control for other variables, but the effect is stronger for 
those opinions related to a higher uncertainty about the viability of the firm 
(going concern), which is consistent with our third hypothesis.
 
 
Prior research finds that discretionary accruals are associated with higher 
information asymmetry (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). Thus, we include as an 
additional control variable in our regressions the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals -estimated with the modified version by Dechow et al. 
(1995) of the Jones (1991) model- in order to assess whether the information 
contained in the audit report impacts on information asymmetry in the market 
beyond the effect of earnings management. In Table 7 we display the main 
analyses by controlling for discretionary accruals and the results regarding the 
effect of qualified audit opinions on information asymmetry remain unchanged. 
Accordingly, we rule out the possibility that the variable which is causing 
information asymmetry is earnings management instead of the audit opinion. 
Moreover, we do not find a significant association between discretionary 
accruals and information asymmetry in the Spanish stock market.  
- INSERT TABLE 7- 
34 
 
In the descriptive analysis we have shown that the distribution of audit 
opinions by Big n and non-Big n auditors is quite similar. Nevertheless, as 
other additional robustness test of the results reported, we assess whether the 
type of auditor influences the results obtained. Thus, in Table 8 we repeat the 
previous analyses excluding audit reports issued by non Big n auditors, and the 
results remain unchanged. 
- INSERT TABLE 8- 
Table 9 reports the results of the two-stage probit approach implemented to 
address the potential endogeneity concerns between audit opinions and 
information asymmetry. Columns (1) and (2) present the probit estimation of 
Model (3), considering the entire sample and only the audit reports issued by 
Big n auditors, respectively. We find that bigger and healthier firms show less 
probability of receiving qualified opinions, whereas firms with higher earnings 
management are more likely to receive a qualified report. On the other hand, 
the results in Column (1) show that the type of auditor is not significantly 
related to the probability of receiving an audit qualification. Besides, 
information asymmetry is not significantly associated with the probability of 
receiving a qualified opinion, so we reject the hypothesis that firms with high 
information asymmetry are more likely to receive a qualified opinion. Columns 
(3) and (4) present the results of the second stage for the entire sample and for 
the sample of Big n auditors, respectively. We find that the coefficient on the 
fitted probability from the first-stage probit model, Est(QAO), is positive and 
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significant at the 1% level in both samples, and the signs and significance of 
the control variables are similar to those reported in previous analyses. This 
finding supports our hypothesis that qualified audit opinions create information 
asymmetry in the market after controlling for the possible endogenous relation 
between the audit opinion and information asymmetry. 
- INSERT TABLE 9- 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the role of the audit report in enhancing the credibility of 
financial information in the stock market. Although previous studies have 
examined the association between information asymmetry and the financial 
reporting process through disclosure, earnings quality, and different proxies of 
audit quality, there is a gap in the literature with regard to the association 
between audit qualifications and information asymmetry. We provide the first 
evidence on this issue for a sample of Spanish listed firms during the period 
2001-2008. 
We use several microstructure measures of information asymmetry: the relative 
spread, intraday price impact, PIN, and a combined factor of the previous three 
measures, and find that firms with audit qualifications show higher information 
asymmetry than those with unqualified opinions. In a subsequent analysis we 
investigate the relation between the type of audit qualification and information 
asymmetry, and find that firms with non-quantified qualifications show higher 
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information asymmetry than firms with unqualified opinions. In contrast, there 
is no significant difference between quantified qualifications and unqualified 
opinions in relation to information asymmetry. Therefore, these findings 
indicate that higher levels of information asymmetry in qualified opinions are 
generated by those qualifications that include unquantifiable uncertainties and 
going concern qualifications. Furthermore, we also find that both uncertainties 
and scope limitations, on the one hand, and going concern qualifications, on 
the other, present higher information asymmetry than unqualified opinions. 
Finally, we find that going concern qualifications have a stronger effect on the 
level of information asymmetry.  
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that audit qualifications are a 
signal of low accounting quality, thus increasing the uncertainty of earnings 
and reducing the credibility of firm’s financial reporting. Nevertheless, 
whereas earnings in firms whose qualifications are quantified can be adjusted 
by market participants and thus are not associated with information asymmetry, 
the earnings numbers of firms whose qualifications are non-quantified are 
noisier and more difficult to interpret by market participants and, as a 
consequence, create information asymmetry in the market. An alternative 
explanation of these results is that information asymmetry is caused by the 
underlying economic environment or reporting characteristics of firms, which 
could also lead to qualified audit opinions, or even that there is an endogenous 
relation between information asymmetry and audit opinions. However, our 
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results are robust to controlling for the financial situation of the firm, the 
discretionary behavior of managers in financial reporting and the potential 
endogeneity between audit qualification and information asymmetry.  
These findings contribute to the recent research on the economic consequences 
of audit opinions and reinforce the role played by the audit report in assessing 
the reliability of financial reporting, confirming that audit opinions affect the 
market’s interpretation of accounting information and that the market is able to 
discriminate between different types of qualifications. By documenting that the 
audit opinion is a valuable source of information in the stock market, our 
results also add to the literature on the effects of accounting quality on 
information asymmetry.  
The results of this study may be specific to the Spanish context and its 
institutional features, as differences in litigation risk, enforcement and financial 
reporting quality may affect the associations found. In particular, the lower 
litigation risk in Spain compared to Anglo-Saxon countries may affect auditor 
independence and thus reduce the probability of issuing a qualified opinion in 
Spain when earnings are overstated. Besides, since the quality of financial 
reporting and investor protection is higher in Anglo-Saxon countries, it is also 
possible that audit opinions convey more information for investors in countries 
such as Spain. This implies that the signal to the market from qualified 
opinions may be stronger in Spain than in Anglo-Saxon countries. If this were 
true, we would expect to find analogous results in countries with similar or 
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lower financial reporting quality and litigation risk than Spain, but the 
generalization of our results to contexts of higher litigation risk is less certain. 
We think this could be an interesting extension of this study. Another 
interesting path for future research on the economic consequences of the audit 
report would be to examine its connection with the cost of capital.  
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TABLE 1: Sample variables descriptive statistics 
 
The table shows some descriptive statistics for our final sample of 562 firm-years. Panel A reports the 
descriptive statistics for continuous variables used in the study. RES is the relative effective spread (i.e., 
twice the absolute value of the difference between marginal trade price and the bid-ask midpoint, divided 
by the bid-ask midpoint). PI is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996) using a 30-
minute interval. PIN is the Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. ASYf 
is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the former measures of information 
asymmetry (RES, PI, and PIN). Size is the logarithm of the total asset at the end of the fiscal year. 
Turnover is the logarithm of the trading volume scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of 
the fiscal year. Volat is a proxy for stock return volatility calculated as the daily squared close-to-open 
mid-quote return (x100); Zscore is the re-estimated Altman Z-score by Begley et al. (1996). Panel B 
reports the frequencies of dummy variables used in the study. BigN is a proxy for audit quality, which 
takes value 1 if the firm is audited by a Big n and 0 otherwise. QAO takes the value 1 in the case of 
qualified opinion, and 0 in the case of unqualified opinion. Quantified takes the value 1 in the case of 
quantified audit reports, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit reports. Non-quantified takes the value 1 in 
the case of non-quantified audit opinions (going concern, scope limitations and uncertainties), and 0 in the 
case of unqualified audit opinions. Uncertainties takes the value 1 in the case of uncertainties and scope 
limitations, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. Gconcern takes the value 1 in the case of 
going concern audit reports, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. 
  
Panel A: Continuous variables
# obs Mean Std. Dev. Perc 10 Median Perc 90
RES 562 0.0066 0.0063 0.0013 0.044 0.0152
PI 562 0.0038 0.0028 0.0011 0.003 0.0076
PIN 561 0.1894 0.0617 0.1225 0.1797 0.2647
ASYf 561 0.0000 1.0000 -1.0519 -0.2578 1.4942
Size 562 14.2206 1.7216 12.0982 14.1309 16.6347
Turnover 562 -6.2655 1.0508 -7.5443 -6.2707 -5.1237
Volat 562 0.0366 0.0514 0.0094 0.0233 0.0766
Zscore 562 0.4968 0.5420 0.2142 0.4232 0.8130
Panel B: Dummy variables
# obs 0 1
QAO 562 491 (87.37%) 71 (12.63%)
BigN 562 33 (5.87%) 529 (94.13%)
# obs Quantified 
Uncertainties Gconcern
Qualified opinions 71 19 (26.76%) 33 (46.48%) 19 (26.76%)
Non-Quantified
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TABLE 2: Audit opinions statistics 
 
The Table reports some descriptive statistics for audit opinions in our sample. Panel A presents the 
distribution of qualifications in the sample. For each audit qualification category two columns are 
reported: the first column indicates the number of firms receiving a certain number of qualifications in 
our eight-year sample period (from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 8) and the second column shows 
the total number of qualifications. Panel B presents descriptive statistics of quantified opinions. 
Quantification is the relative value over total assets of the income effect of quantified opinions. 
Abs_Quantification is the absolute value of Quantification. Finally, Panel C reports the distribution of 
audit opinions by auditor category (Big n and non-Big n). 
  
Panel A: Distribution of qualifications per firm-year
# QAO in
the sample period # firms Total # firms Total # firms Total # firms Total # firms Total
1 19 19 10 10 13 13 8 8 7 7
2 7 14 1 2 7 14 1 2 7 14
3 3 9 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 8 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0
6 1 6 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0
7 1 7 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0
8 1 8 0 0 1 8 0 0 1 8
Total 34 71 13 19 24 52 11 19 16 33
Average qualifications
per firm
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on Quantified Opinions
# obs Mean Std. Dev. Perc 10 Median Perc 90
Quantification 19 -0.0681 0.1004 -0.1632 -0.0275 0.0056
>0 3 0.0071 0.0068 0.0012 0.0056 0.0145
<0 16 -0.0822 0.1037 -0.2380 -0.0525 -0.0027
Abs_Quantification 19 0.0704 0.0988 0.0025 0.0275 0.1632
Panel C: Audit Opinion by auditor category
0 1
0 29 (87.88%) 462 (87.33%)
1 4 (12.12%) 67 (12.67%)
0 29 (93.55%) 462 (96.45%)
1 2 (6.45%) 17 (3.55%)
0 29 (93.55%) 462 (90.23%)
1 2 (6.45%) 50 (9.77%)
0 29 (96.67%) 462 (96.25%)
1 1 (3.33%) 18 (3.75%)
0 29 (96.67%) 462 (93.52%)
1 1 (3.33%) 32 (6.48%)
Gconcern UncertaintiesQAO
2.09 1.46 2.17 1.73 2.06
Quantified Non-Quantified
BigN
Uncertainties
QAO
Quantified
Non-Quantified
Gconcern
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TABLE 3: Correlation matrix 
 
The table reports the correlation coefficient between the variables used in the study. RES is the relative 
effective spread. PI is price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996) using a 30-minute 
interval. PIN is the Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. ASYf is the 
composite index of information asymmetry based on RES, PI, and PIN. Size is the logarithm of the total 
asset at the end of the fiscal year. Turnover is the logarithm of the trading volume scaled by the market 
value of the firm’s equity at the end of the fiscal year. Volat is a proxy for stock return volatility 
calculated as the daily squared close-to-open mid-quote return (x100). Zscore is the re-estimated Altman 
Z-score by Begley et al. (1996). *, **, and *** represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
RES PI PIN ASYf Size Turnover Volat Zscore
RES 1
PI 0.928 *** 1
PIN 0.577 *** 0.511 *** 1
ASYf 0.957 *** 0.936 *** 0.756 *** 1
Size -0.620 *** -0.605 *** -0.562 *** -0.670 *** 1
Turnover -0.306 *** -0.147 *** -0.535 *** -0.352 *** 0.179 *** 1
Volat 0.286 *** 0.419 *** 0.014 0.286 *** -0.069 * 0.259 *** 1
Zscore -0.034 -0.028 0.042 -0.012 -0.100 ** -0.115 *** -0.069 1
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TABLE 4: Univariate analysis of the relationship between audit opinions and 
audit quality with information asymmetry 
 
The table presents the information asymmetry proxies by audit opinion groups (Panel A) and audit quality 
groups (Panel B). QAO takes the value 1 in the case of qualified opinion, and zero in the case of 
unqualified opinion. BigN is a proxy for audit quality, which takes value 1 if the firm is audited by a Big n 
and 0 otherwise. RES is the relative effective spread. PI is price impact measure proposed by Huang and 
Stoll (1996). PIN is the Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. ASYf is 
the composite index of information asymmetry based on RES, PI, and PIN. The t-test and Mann-Whitney 
(z-statistic) test are used to test the null hypothesis of no significant differences in each information 
asymmetry proxy between two groups. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: Mean differences by audit opinion
QAO #obs Mean Std.dev. t-test z-statistic
0 391 0.0058 0.0060
1 52 0.0098 0.0081
0 391 0.0034 0.0027
1 52 0.0052 0.0036
0 390 0.1864 0.0628
1 52 0.1996 0.0512
0 390 -0.1219 0.9739
1 52 0.4506 1.1262
Panel B: Mean differences by audit quality
BigN #obs Mean Std.dev. t-test z-statistic
0 27 0.0097 0.0056
1 416 0.0061 0.0064
0 27 0.0049 0.0021
1 416 0.0035 0.0029
0 27 0.2016 0.0313
1 415 0.1870 0.0631
0 27 0.4156 0.6271
1 415 -0.0851 1.0216
RES
PI
PIN
ASYf
-3.417 ***
-3.444 ***
-1.460
-3.854 ***
-3.858 ***
-2.300 **
-3.860 ***
RES 2.829 *** 4.368 ***
-3.906 ***
PIN 2.157 2.187 **
PI 2.500 *** 3.943 ***
ASYf 3.831 *** 3.843 ***
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TABLE 5: Regressions estimates for information asymmetry on audit opinions 
 
The table presents the regression coefficients for information asymmetry proxies on audit opinions and 
control variables:  
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6           i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
ASY β βQAO β Size β Turnover β Volat β BigN β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
 
The information asymmetry proxies are: RES, the relative effective spread; PI, the price impact measure 
proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN is the Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et 
al. (1996) model. ASYf is the composite index of information asymmetry based on RES, PI, and PIN. The 
independent variables are: QAO, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of qualified opinion, 
and 0 in the case of unqualified opinion. Size is the logarithm of the total asset at the end of the fiscal 
year. Turnover is the logarithm of the trading volume scaled by the market value of the firm’s equity at 
the end of the fiscal year. Volat is a proxy for stock return volatility calculated as the daily squared close-
to-open mid-quote return (x100). BigN is a proxy for audit quality, which takes value 1 if the firm is 
audited by a Big n and 0 otherwise. Zscore is the re-estimated Altman Z-score by Begley et al. (1996). 
Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 
two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
  
RES PI PIN ASYf
QAO 0.0024 ** 0.001 ** 0.0064 0.3133 **
(2.21) (2.18) (0.89) (2.34)
Size -0.0022 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0166 *** -0.3651 ***
(-6.08) (-7.60) (-8.26) (-8.17)
Turnover -0.0017 *** -0.0004 * -0.0279 *** -0.3171 ***
(-2.66) (-1.98) (-6.77) (-3.64)
Volat 0.0253 *** 0.0140 ** 0.0783 4.0100 ***
(3.82) (3.67) (1.28) (3.32)
BigN -0.0023 * -0.0007 * -0.0003 -0.2525 *
(-1.77) (-1.70) (-0.03) (-1.66)
Zscore -0.0014 ** -0.0006 ** -0.0046 ** -0.1949 **
(-2.20) (-2.31) (-2.11) (-2.49)
Intercept 0.0334 *** 0.0175 *** 0.2423 *** 3.9277 ***
(3.61) (5.10) (5.17) (3.46)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.5994 0.6301 0.5759 0.6846
#obs 443 443 442 442
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TABLE 6: Regressions estimates for Information asymmetry index on different 
types of qualified audit opinions.  
 
The table presents the regression coefficients for information asymmetry composite index (ASYf) on 
different types of audit qualifications (QAO) and control variables: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6           i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
ASYf β βQAO β Size β Turnover β Volat β BigN β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
 
The independent variable QAO is Quantified in (1), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of 
quantified audit opinions, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. QAO is Non-quantified in (2), a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of non-quantified audit opinions and 0 in the case of 
unqualified audit opinions. QAO is Uncertainties in (3), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the 
case of uncertainties and scope limitations, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. Finally, QAO 
is  Gconcern in (4), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of going concern audit reports, 
and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. Control variables are: Size, the logarithm of the total asset 
at the end of the fiscal year; Turnover, the logarithm of the trading volume scaled by the market value of 
the firm’s equity at the end of the fiscal year; Volat, a proxy for stock return volatility calculated as the 
daily squared close-to-open mid-quote return (x100). BigN is a proxy for audit quality, which takes value 
1 if the firm is audited by a Big n and 0 otherwise. Zscore is the re-estimated Altman Z-score by Begley 
et al. (1996). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level in parentheses.*, **, and *** represent 
significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantified 0.1213
(0.54)
Non-Quantified 0.4405 ***
(2.88)
Gconcern 1.0200 ***
(2.84)
Uncertainties 0.2787 **
(2.04)
Size -0.3508 *** -0.3502 *** -0.3472 *** -0.3359 ***
(-7.25) (-8.03) (-7.16) (-7.64)
Turnover -0.3333 *** -0.3318 *** -0.3395 *** -0.3565 ***
(-3.62) (-3.75) (-3.63) (-3.98)
Volat 4.2078 *** 3.8524 *** 3.6650 *** 3.9352 ***
(3.22) (3.40) (3.40) (3.43)
BigN -0.2868 * -0.2818 * -0.2964 * -0.3129 *
(-1.78) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.79)
Zscore -0.1573 ** -0.1928 ** -0.1806 ** -0.1542 **
(-2.30) (-2.51) (-2.55) (-2.40)
Intercept 3.0710 ** 3.0524 *** 2.9892 ** 2.6753 **
(2.60) (2.71) (2.47) (2.35)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.6708 0.6909 0.6824 0.6939
#obs 408 424 398 416
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TABLE 7: Regressions estimates for information asymmetry index on different 
types of qualified audit opinions controlling for discretionary accruals. 
 
The table presents the regression coefficients for information asymmetry composite index (ASYf) on 
different types of audit qualifications and control variables: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 7            i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
ASYf β βQAO β Size β Turnover β Volat β BigN β Zscore β DiscAcc βYear β Ind ε
The independent variable QAO in (1) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of qualified 
opinion, and 0 in the case of unqualified opinion. QAO is Quantified in (2), a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 in the case of quantified audit opinions, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. QAO 
is Non-quantified in (3), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of non-quantified audit 
opinions and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. QAO is Uncertainties in (4), a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 in the case of uncertainties and scope limitations, and 0 in the case of unqualified 
audit opinions. Finally, QAO is Gconcern in (5), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of 
going concern audit reports, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. Control variables are: Size, 
the logarithm of the total asset at the end of the fiscal year; Turnover, the logarithm of the trading volume 
scaled by the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the fiscal year; Volat, a proxy for stock return 
volatility calculated as the daily squared close-to-open mid-quote return (x100). Zscore is the re-estimated 
Altman Z-score by Begley et al. (1996). DiscAcc is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated 
by the Jones (1991) model modified by Dechow et al. (1995). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm 
level in parentheses.*, **, and *** represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QAO 0.2878 **
(2.18)
Quantified 0.1021
(0.47)
Non-Quantified 0.4118 ***
(2.71)
Gconcern 0.9338 ***
(2.55)
Uncertainties 0.2667 *
(1.92)
Size -0.3757 *** -0.3611 *** -0.3610 *** -0.3579 *** -0.3457 ***
(-8.12) (-7.23) (-7.92) (-7.06) (-7.50)
Turnover -0.3244 *** -0.3376 *** -0.3397 *** -0.3452 *** -0.3610 ***
(-3.79) (-3.74) (-3.90) (-3.74) (-4.09)
Volat 3.7883 *** 4.0728 *** 3.6370 *** 3.4969 *** 3.8029 ***
(3.30) (3.24) (3.38) (3.37) (3.45)
BigN -0.2305 -0.2676 -0.2561 -0.2691 -0.2942
(-1.50) (-1.65) (-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.66)
Zscore -0.3655 ** -0.3105 ** -0.3618 ** -0.3377 ** -0.2944 **
(-2.46) (-2.20) (-2.46) (-2.36) (-2.20)
DiscAcc -0.4445 -0.4924 -0.3267 -0.2838 -0.4129
(-0.84) (-0.90) (-0.60) (-0.50) (-0.76)
Intercept 4.1857 *** 3.1961 ** 3.2625 ** 3.7985 ** 2.8843 **
(3.54) (2.66) (2.78) (2.90) (2.42)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.6903 0.6760 0.6962 0.6872 0.6978
#obs 438 404 420 394 412
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TABLE 8: Regressions estimates for Information asymmetry index on different 
types of qualified audit opinions from Big n auditors 
 
The table presents the regression coefficients for information asymmetry composite index (ASYf) on 
different types of audit qualifications from Big n auditors and control variables: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6           i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
ASYf β βQAO β Size β Turnover β Volat β BigN β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
 
The independent variable QAO in (1) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of qualified 
opinion, and 0 in the case of unqualified opinion. QAO is Quantified in (2), a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 in the case of quantified audit opinions, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. QAO 
is Non-quantified in (3), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of non-quantified audit 
opinions and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. QAO is Uncertainties in (4), a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 in the case of uncertainties and scope limitations, and 0 in the case of unqualified 
audit opinions. Finally, QAO is Gconcern in (5), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of 
going concern audit reports, and 0 in the case of unqualified audit opinions. Control variables are: Size, 
the logarithm of the total asset at the end of the fiscal year; Turnover, the logarithm of the trading volume 
scaled by the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the fiscal year; Volat, a proxy for stock return 
volatility calculated as the daily squared close-to-open mid-quote return (x100). Zscore is the re-estimated 
Altman Z-score by Begley et al. (1996). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level in parentheses.*, **, 
and *** represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QAO 0.3134 **
(2.24)
Quantified 0.0452
(0.27)
Non-Quantified 0.4604 ***
(2.75)
Gconcern 1.0380 ***
(2.80)
Uncertainties 0.2766 *
(1.85)
Size -0.3628 *** -0.3453 *** -0.3509 *** -0.3492 *** -0.3370 ***
(-7.98) (-7.03) (-7.89) (-7.01) (-7.43)
Turnover -0.3356 *** -0.3568 *** -0.3434 *** -0.3534 *** -0.3716 ***
(-3.60) (-3.62) (-3.64) (-3.54) (-3.86)
Volat 3.9141 *** 4.0390 *** 3.7661 *** 3.5623 *** 3.8229 ***
(3.38) (3.38) (3.47) (3.48) (3.55)
Zscore -0.1919 ** -0.1525 ** -0.1885 ** -0.1755 ** -0.1494 **
(-2.45) (-2.24) (-2.46) (-2.50) (-2.34)
Intercept 3.5178 *** 3.0112 ** 3.2624 *** 3.1928 ** 2.0835 *
(3.05) (2.43) (2.81) (2.55) (1.81)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.6927 0.6810 0.6969 0.6884 0.7006
#obs 414 383 399 376 391
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TABLE 9: Two-stage probit regressions estimates on the information asymmetry 
and audit opinions relationship. 
 
The table presents in columns 1 and 2 the following first-stage probit regressions of the audit opinion on 
information asymmetry: 
0 1 2 3 4 5( )         i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
P QAO β β Size β BigN β Zscore β DiscAcc β ASYf βYear β Ind ε
 
0 1 2 3 4( )        i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,t
t j
P QAO β β Size β Zscore β DiscAcc β ASYf βYear β Ind ε
 
In columns 3 and 4 the following second-stage regressions are estimated:  
  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 61           i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,ti,t
t j
ASYf β β Est QAO β Size β Turnover β Volat β BigN β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
 0 1 2 3 4 51         i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t t j i,ti,t
t j
ASYf β β Est QAO β Size β Turnover β Volat β Zscore βYear β Ind ε
 
ASYf is the composite index of information asymmetry based on RES, PI, and PIN measures. QAO is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of qualified opinion, and zero in the case of unqualified 
opinion. Size is the logarithm of the total asset at the end of the fiscal year. Turnover is the logarithm of 
the trading volume scaled by the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the fiscal year. Volat is a 
proxy for stock return volatility calculated as the daily squared close-to-open mid-quote return (x100). 
BigN is a proxy for audit quality, which takes value 1 if the firm is audited by a Big n and 0 otherwise. 
Zscore is the re-estimated Altman Z-score by Begley et al. (1996). DiscAcc is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals estimated by the Jones (1991) model modified by Dechow et al. (1995). Robust t-
statistics clustered at the firm level in parentheses.*, **, and *** represent significance levels at two-tail 
tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
P(QAO) P(QAO) ASYf ASYf
Est (QAO) 1.6271 *** 1.6343 ***
(4.78) (4.90)
Size -0.2132 ** -0.2248 ** -0.3197 *** -0.3145 ***
(-2.12) (-2.20) (-6.35) (-6.20)
Turnover -0.3389 *** -0.3592 ***
(-4.25) (-4.21)
Volat 3.8312 *** 3.7250 ***
(3.59) (3.67)
BigN 0.4121 -0.2549 *
(0.96) (-1.85)
Zscore -2.0408 *** -2.0060 *** -0.2381 ** -0.2356 **
(-3.10) (-2.98) (-2.23) (-2.12)
DiscAcc 2.5894 ** 2.4013 **
(2.55) (2.26)
ASY 0.1834 0.1643
(1.14) (1.00)
Intercept 2.9278 * 3.5476 ** 3.0698 ** 1.9065 *
(1.80) (2.11) (2.49) (1.62)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.2391 0.241 0.7083 0.7158
#obs 556 523 439 411
